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he European Commission’s in-depth inquiry into retail banking is long overdue. Its 
findings are hardly surprising: for years high fees persisted, market concentration loomed 
and there was little cross-border competition. Unfortunately, European consumers and 
small businesses became used to it, but times could now be changing for the better. DG 
Competition states that it has found “widespread competition barriers” that raise the cost of retail 
banking, but “competition concerns” are not evidence of breaches of competition law. The 
Commission must now prove that its claims are not unfounded: the next steps are investigation and 
prosecution of individual cases. The industry, on the other hand, must address the concerns of the 
Commission through a critical assessment of its business practices and through voluntary reforms 
if necessary. More competition in retail banking services is only beneficial: it will lead to improved 
service quality, lower prices and larger savings in the European Union. The inquiry should be seen 
as chance for increasing competition. 
The European Commission has directed harsh criticism at the retail banking industry in Europe: in its 
final “Report on the retail banking sector inquiry”, it finds major competition barriers, restrictions and 
distortions in the common market for retail banking services. Retail banking encompasses savings, 
borrowing and payment services for consumers and small businesses. In its inquiry, the Commission has 
examined the markets for payment cards and systems as well as the market for current accounts and 
related services. Such sector inquiries aim to identify whether there are sufficient grounds to investigate 
possible anti-competitive practices by the industry. If this is the case and evidence of breaches of national 
or EU competition law are found, the business practices or arrangements can be addressed by anti-trust 
action. Sector inquiries are the first step in the full-scale enforcement of anti-trust law. They are also a 
tool to spark voluntary changes in the industry. 
 
T
E 
C 
R 
I E 
C 
R 
I 
ECRI COMMENTARY, NO. 1 (31. JANUARY 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE PRIMARY FINDINGS: THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH  
The Commission has several concerns regarding payment cards and payment systems, which generate 
an estimated overall value of €1.350 billion a year,. One concern is high concentration as measured by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. For this index, market shares of companies are squared and added, with 
results below 2,000 usually not raising competition concerns. However, the level of concentration in the 
acquisition of cards is well above 5,000 in many European markets (such as PT, FI and DK). Cards 
issuing, on the other hand, is not seen as concentrated. The Commission has voiced further concerns with 
regard to large variations in merchant and interchange fees, high profitability and divergent technical 
standards.  
In the current account and related services inquiry (generating €250-275 billion in gross income per 
year), it found a concentration above 70% based on retail income in the 3 or 5 largest players (so-called 
CR-3 and CR-5 ratios) in several countries (FI, NL, BE and SE). Profits before taxes are over 30% in 
some countries (IE, ES, FI and SE). The Commission observed that cooperation among banks and credit 
registers might be used as market entry barriers. In addition, there is evidence of product tying and 
introducing obstacles to consumer mobility. Taken together, these factors limit competition and fragment 
markets along national borders, unnecessarily raising the cost of retail banking for consumers. 
 
Is it possible that this situation will change soon? Retail banking (excluding credit cards) has – to a 
great extent – always been local or regional – even in markets such as the US, where consumers tend to 
cluster products and services they use at one bank and only switch banks (or accounts) when they move. 
In Europe, cross-border lending to consumers and small companies is minimal: there is simply at present 
no interest, in such services on the part of banks or consumers. There are explanations from behavioural 
economics for little consumer action, namely that human attention is limited and rationality is bounded. 
Therefore, the attention span devoted to screening and comparing of retail banking products is limited. 
For instance, one can hardly expect consumers to screen all national credit advertisements for the best 
price. Why would they bother to screen international ones? It is sometimes fairly difficult to discern 
whether it is the suppliers’ behaviour or general market conditions (such as certain demand-side features) 
that limit competition. The Commission must now prove that banks willingly and systematically breach 
competition law such as Arts. 81 and 82. Art. 81 prohibits price fixing, control of production, territorial 
market division and tying (bundling), Art. 82 prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. National 
competition authorities are now asked to help to investigate cases that might warrant further action. And 
the Commission has made it clear that it will make “full use” of its power to tackle the barriers.     
 
THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH: WHAT’S CAUSE AND EFFECT?  
DG Competition monitors and analyses the usual suspects: market concentration and performance (prices, 
fees and profitability), bundling or tying, etc. Simple economic theory teaches that if prices are above 
short-term marginal costs, profits are ‘too high’ or at least higher than in competitive environments. 
Market structure – most simply the number of competitors – influences market performance through 
price-setting behaviour of companies. The problem is that the direction of effect is not always clear: most 
measures for market structure are not what economists call an exogenous variable: profits and market 
structure interact and the direction of effect is not always clear. This is the so-called ‘endogeneity’ 
problem, which can only be solved by looking at longer time series and applying more complicated 
statistical analysis. The type of advanced analysis that might shed more light on the very issues criticised 
by the Commission is not what one finds by looking at the Commission’s report. There are some E 
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regressions in the chapter on consumer mobility, but results are weak and provide only a 
snapshot. Relations between profitability, market structure and market conduct are 
complicated and a descriptive analysis is not sufficient to draw final conclusions. In that 
sense, the Commission must improve the techniques applied for inquiries so that the analysis becomes 
truly analytical and does not remain on the descriptive level paired with random ad hoc descriptions of 
individual cases.   
 
In addition, there are other factors that influence market performance; such as technology and demand-
side conditions. The problem with criticising prices in markets is that one must know better, or, in other 
words, which price is right? Markets are never perfect; however, some might be more imperfect than 
others. The usual suspects of market failure are: ‘natural’ monopolies, public goods, externalities or 
information asymmetries. The latter two are especially important in banking. Externalities explain 
concentration in network markets, or simply put: the bigger the net, the better as this has scale effects. 
Information asymmetries explain that banks do not have a complete picture about a borrower’s risk. 
Therefore, they must use credit registers in which they share information about consumers. This industry 
– credit bureaus – has for too long operated under the radar of competition authorities. It is time for an in-
depth study of how registers can be used for erecting informational market barriers, what are the 
competition conditions in the industry and whether there is evidence of strategic incomplete information-
sharing.  
 
The retail sector inquiry can only address business practices of the industry. Without diminishing the 
importance of that focus, one must also discuss the role of government or consumers. Only by looking 
from a bird’s eye perspective can the whole picture emerge, although this cannot be addressed by a retail 
sector inquiry. For instance, national governments are in charge of dismantling legal obstacles for cross-
border transactions. 
European competition authorities must ask themselves if the enforcement of competition policy was not 
too lax in the past. High market concentration, lock-in and product bundling allow companies to shift 
economic rents accruing from the transaction to the disadvantage of consumers. This, however, is nothing 
new. Maybe there should have been a thorough analysis of the technical and informational structure in 
retail banking as well as harsher enforcement of anti-trust law on national level.  
The Commission’s action is long overdue and must be welcomed. But this is just a first step, and 
accusations make no proof. DG Competition and national competition authorities must now live up to the 
claims and prove by whom, how and where competition law was infringed. These breaches should in fact 
be prosecuted with full force. The future direction should, however, focus on market entry and exit 
barriers (and less on the number of competitors) and on a harmonisation of technical standards. Reduced 
market barriers, harmonised standards and fair but efficient enforcement of competition law will 
contribute to intensified competition in retail banking in Europe.  
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European Credit Research Institute 
The EUROPEAN CREDIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE  is an independent research institution devoted to the 
study of banking and credit. It focuses on institutional, economic and political aspects related to retail 
finance and credit reporting in Europe but also in non-European countries. ECRI provides expert analysis 
and academic research for a better understanding of the economic and social impact of credit. We monitor 
markets and regulatory changes as well as their impact on the national and international level. ECRI was 
founded in 1999 by the CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (CEPS) together with a consortium of 
European credit institutions. The institute is a legal entity of CEPS and receives funds from different 
sources. For further information, visit the website: www.ecri.be 
 
ECRI Commentary Series 
The ECRI COMMENTARY SERIES provides short comments on ongoing developments in European credit 
markets.. ECRI researchers as well as external experts contribute to the series.  
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